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On sequent aluli for intuitionisti propositional logiVtezslav SvejdarAbstrat. The well-known Dyko's 1992 alulus/proedure for intuitionisti proposi-tional logi is onsidered and analyzed. It is shown that the alulus is Kripke ompleteand the proedure in fat works in polynomial spae. Then a multi-onlusion intuition-isti alulus is introdued, obtained by adding one new rule to known aluli. A simpleproof of Kripke ompleteness and polynomial-spae deidability of this alulus is given.An upper bound on the depth of a Kripke ounter-model is obtained.Keywords: intuitionisti logi, polynomial-spae, sequent alulus, Kripke semantisClassiation: 03B20, 03B35, 03F051. IntrodutionA non-lassial logi often is or an be dened by means of itsKripke semantis :a propositional formula A may or may not be satised in a node of a Kripkemodel K, if it is not satised in some node of K then K is a ounter-model for A,and a tautology of the given logi is dened as a formula having no ounter-modelin the lass C of models hosen to represent that logi. R. Ladner in [7℄ onstrutsdeision proedures for the most ommon modal logis like S4 or T based purelyon Kripke semantis. When attempting to deide whether a given formula A hasa ounter-model in the lass C one often faes the need to onstrut a Kripkemodel with a node a suh that all formulas from a ertain nite set   are satisedand simultaneously all formulas from another nite set  are not satised in a.Sequent aluli are not mentioned in [7℄, but a model K with a node a suhthat a satises all formulas in   and violates all formulas in  is the same as aKripke ounter-model for the sequent 〈  ⇒  〉. So there exists a natural linkfrom Kripke semantis to sequent (Gentzen) aluli: when onstruting a deisionproedure one is sometimes able to simultaneously design a sequent alulus forthe logi in question.A deision proedure an also be based on a sequent alulus itself. It worksso that it onstruts the proof of the given sequent by using the rules of thealulus in reverse, i.e. by starting from a given sequent and using the rules ofthe alulus in bakward diretion, with a hope to arrive at axioms (i.e. initialThis work is a part of the researh plan MSM 0021620839 that is naned by the Ministryof Eduation of the Czeh Republi.
160 V. Svejdarsequents). Then it may be a problem to ensure termination of the proedure.For example the ontration rule, if used in reverse, allows one to dupliate anyformula of the given sequent. So an unorganized use of the ontration rule mayause the proedure to yle. It is known that the presene of the ontration ruleis essential for many aluli met in the literature. If, as in this paper, sequentsonsist of sets rather than sequenes of formulas then there is no ontrationrule, but the option to dupliate a formula is still there beause the rules allow aprinipal formula to simultaneously be a side formula.R. Dyko in [4℄ found a terminating alulus for intuitionisti propositionallogi. However the paper [4℄ does not mention Kripke semantis and is not speiabout the omputational omplexity of the proedure obtained. We analyze thepaper [4℄ and show that a Kripke ompleteness theorem is in fat impliit in it.Thus this paper oers a better insight into [4℄, espeially to those who primarilythink about Kripke semantis. We also show that if some improvements areimplemented then it an be shown that the deision proedure works in polynomialspae. Then we onsider a seond alulus for intuitionisti logi, now a multi-on-lusion one, allowing any number of formulas in suedent. We again show, inthis ase by a muh simpler proof, that the alulus in question is omplete w.r.t.Kripke semantis and yields a polynomial-spae deision proedure. We alsoobtain an upper bound on the depth of Kripke ounter-model. The advantage ofour multi-onlusion alulus is that it diers from aluli known e.g. from [11℄and [6℄ in only one simple additional rule.This paper pays more attention to the question whether deision proeduresan be derived from known aluli than to the question how to onstrut the mosteÆient deision proedure. I believe that it is of some interest to have relativelysimple proofs that simultaneously show Kripke ompleteness, ut eliminability andpolynomial-spae deidability for aluli more or less traditional. Note howeverthat J. Hudelmaier [5℄ onstruted a alulus and a deision proedure with muhlower spae requirements than ours.2. Kripke semantis and sequent aluliWe hoose {&,∨,→,⊥} as the base set of logial onnetives . So propositionalformulas are built up from (propositional) atoms and the symbol ⊥ for falsityusing onjuntion, disjuntion, and impliation. We treat ¬A as a shorthandfor A → ⊥. In syntax analysis, impliation → has lower priority than onjun-tion & and disjuntion ∨. So e.g. p ∨ q → r is a shorthand for (p ∨ q) → r.A sequent is a pair of nite sets of formulas; we write 〈  ⇒  〉 for a sequentonsisting of sets   and . The sets   and  are alled anteedent and sue-dent of the sequent 〈  ⇒  〉. When writing down sequents we use the usualnotational onventions and omit urly braes and symbols for set union and theempty set. So e.g. 〈 , C ⇒ 〉 is a shorthand for 〈  ∪ {C} ⇒ ∅ 〉, et.A Kripke frame for intuitionisti logi is a pair 〈W,≤〉 where W 6= ∅ and
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≤ is a reexive and transitive relation on W . The elements of W are nodes ;if x ≤ y then the node y is said to be aessible from x. A truth relation (ora foring relation) on a Kripke frame 〈W,≤〉 is a relation ‖− between nodesand propositional formulas satisfying the persisteny ondition (if x ‖− p for anatom p and x ≤ y then y ‖− p), respeting onjuntions, disjuntions, and falsity(x ‖− A&B iff x ‖− A and x ‖− B, x ‖− A∨B iff x ‖− A or x ‖− B, and x ‖−/ ⊥)and satisfying the well-known \modal" ondition for impliation: x ‖− A → Biff for eah y aessible from x it is the ase that y ‖− B whenever y ‖− A. Itan easily be veried that any relation between nodes and propositional atomssatisfying the persisteny ondition extends uniquely to a truth relation. Also, if
‖− is a truth relation on a frame 〈W,≤〉 then the persisteny ondition holds forall formulas, not just atoms. A Kripke model for intuitionisti propositional logiis a triple 〈W,≤, ‖−〉 where 〈W,≤〉 is a Kripke frame and ‖− is a truth relationon 〈W,≤〉.If K = 〈W,≤, ‖−〉 is a Kripke model then x ‖− A is read \A is satised in x" or\x satises A". If A is satised in all x ∈ W then A is valid in K. The model K isa ounter-model for a sequent 〈  ⇒  〉 if some element of its domain W satisesall formulas in   and simultaneously none formula from . A sequent 〈  ⇒  〉is intuitionistially tautologial if it has no ounter-model. A formula A is anintuitionisti tautology if the sequent 〈 ⇒ A 〉, with empty anteedent and A asthe only formula in suedent, is intuitionistially tautologial. It is evident that
A is an intuitionisti tautology iff A is valid in eah Kripke model.An example of a Kripke frame is the struture 〈{a, b}, {[a, a℄, [a, b℄, [b, b℄}〉 hav-ing two nodes a and b, with b aessible from a but a not aessible from b. Let atruth relation on this frame be dened by stipulating that p is satised in b andviolated in a, while q is violated in both a and b. One an easily hek that theformula p → q is nowhere satised, hene a ‖− (p → q) → p. Thus this model is aounter-model for the sequent 〈 (p → q) → p ⇒ p 〉. This model also shows thatthe formula ((p → q) → p) → p is not an intuitionisti tautology.Examples of sequents that are intuitionistially tautologial are(1) 〈 , p ⇒ p 〉, 〈 ,⊥ ⇒ G 〉.Another example of an intuitionistially tautologial sequent is any sequent of theform 〈 (A → B) ∨ (B → A) → ⊥ ⇒ 〉.We all the least element (if it exists) of a Kripke model K a root of K.If K = 〈W,≤, ‖−〉 and a0 ∈ W then submodel generated by a0 is the model
K0 = 〈W0,≤0, ‖−0〉 where W0 = {x ∈ W ; a0 ≤ x} and ≤0 and ‖−0 are therestritions of ≤ and ‖− to W0. One an easily verify that if A is a propositionalformula and x ∈ W0 then x ‖− A ⇔ x ‖−0 A. So in the sequel we an assumethat if K is a ounter-model for A then K has a root a and that it is the root awhere a ‖−/ A. More about Kripke models an be found in various soures, e.g. in[2℄ or [11℄.
162 V. SvejdarSequent aluli have unary and binary dedution rules. An example of a binaryrule (with two premises) is(4) 〈 , E ⇒ G 〉, 〈 , F ⇒ G 〉 / 〈 , E ∨ F ⇒ G 〉.The formula in whih the onnetive is introdued, whih is the formula E ∨ Fin ase of the rule (4), is alled prinipal formula, while the formulas that maydisappear by using the rule, whih are the formulas E and F in ase of the rule (4),ould be alled minor formulas of the rule in question. The formulas that are nothanged by using the rule, whih are the formulas in   ∪ {G} in ase of (4), arealled side formulas . Both minor and prinipal formulas may simultaneously beside formulas. This, in ase of the rule (4), means that eah of the formulas E, Fand E ∨ F an be an element of the set  .The rule (4) is sound in the sense that if both sequents 〈 , E ⇒ G 〉 and
〈 , F ⇒ G 〉 are intuitionistially tautologial then also the resulting sequent
〈 , E ∨ F ⇒ G 〉 is intuitionistially tautologial. The rule (4), moreover, isinvertible in the sense that 〈 , E ∨ F ⇒ G 〉 is intuitionistially tautologial ifand only if both sequents 〈 , E ⇒ G 〉 and 〈 , F ⇒ G 〉 are intuitionistiallytautologial.3. A single-onlusion deision proedureIn this setion we onsider a single-onlusion alulus for intuitionisti propo-sitional logi, where all sequents have exatly one formula in suedent. We willspeify a deision proedure for intuitionisti propositional logi based on thisalulus.Lemma 1. The following rules:
〈  ⇒ E 〉, 〈  ⇒ F 〉 / 〈  ⇒ E & F 〉(2)
〈 , E, F ⇒ G 〉 / 〈 , E & F ⇒ G 〉(3)
〈 , E ⇒ G 〉, 〈 , F ⇒ G 〉 / 〈 , E ∨ F ⇒ G 〉(4)
〈 , E ⇒ F 〉 / 〈  ⇒ E → F 〉(5)
〈 , p, D ⇒ G 〉 / 〈 , p, p → D ⇒ G 〉,(6)where D, E, F , G are formulas and p is an atom, are sound and invertible.The rules
〈  ⇒ E 〉 / 〈  ⇒ E ∨ F 〉, 〈  ⇒ F 〉 / 〈  ⇒ E ∨ F 〉(7)
〈 , C → D ⇒ C 〉, 〈 , D ⇒ G 〉 / 〈 , C → D ⇒ G 〉(8)are sound. The rule(9) 〈 , D ⇒ G 〉 / 〈 , D, C1 → (C2 → ( . . → (Ck → D). .)) ⇒ G 〉
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 163is sound and invertible.Proof: Look at (5). Let K = 〈W,≤, ‖−〉 be a ounter-model for 〈  ⇒ E → F 〉.Assume that K has a root a and that a satises all formulas in   and violatesthe impliation E → F . So there is a node a0 suh that a0 ‖− E and a0 ‖−/ F .By the persisteny ondition, a0 satises all formulas in  . So the submodel K0of K generated by a0 is a ounter-model for the sequent 〈 , E ⇒ F 〉. All theremaining ases are trivial. We intend to base our deision proedure on the rules in Lemma 1 and on otherrules speied below. It starts with a given sequent 〈 ⇒ H 〉 and (essentially)repeatedly applies the rules (2){(6) to it in the reverse (right to left) diretion,thus reduing the question whether a given sequent is intuitionistially tautolog-ial to same questions about one or two simpler sequents. If all paths of theomputation terminate with an initial sequent of the form (1) then the originalsequent 〈 ⇒ H 〉 is intuitionistially tautologial. If none of the rules (2){(6),still in the right to left diretion, is appliable to a sequent whih is not initial thenthe sequent is irreduible in the sense of the following denition. When speakingabout appliation of a rule, we will omit the words \in reverse" or \right to left"when the diretion is lear from ontext.Denition 2. A sequent 〈  ⇒ G 〉 is irreduible if
◦ G is a disjuntion, or an atom p suh that p /∈  , or the formula ⊥,
◦ no formula in   is a onjuntion, disjuntion, or the formula ⊥,
◦   ontains no pair p, p → D where p is an atom.This denition, as well as the rule (6) above, is taken from R. Dykho's [4℄.Note that if 〈  ⇒ G 〉 is irreduible then   ontains only impliations and atoms.Theorem 3. An irreduible sequent 〈  ⇒ G 〉 is intuitionistially tautologialif and only if some of the following onditions is true:
◦ G has the form E ∨F and some of the sequents 〈  ⇒ E 〉 and 〈  ⇒ F 〉is intuitionistially tautologial, or
◦ there is an impliation C → D ∈   suh that C is ompound (not anatom or ⊥) and both sequents 〈  ⇒ C 〉 and 〈 − {C → D}, D ⇒ G 〉are intuitionistially tautologial.Proof: The non-trivial diretion is ⇒. Assume that G is E ∨F ; the other ases,where G is ⊥ or an atom, are similar but simpler. Let C1 → D1, . ., Cm → Dm bethe list of all impliations C → D in   suh that C is ompound. Assume thatnone of the sequents 〈  ⇒ E 〉 and 〈  ⇒ F 〉 is intuitionistially tautologialand assume that for eah i some of the two sequents 〈 − {Ci → Di}, Di ⇒ G 〉and 〈  ⇒ Ci 〉 is not intuitionistially tautologial. It is evident that any Kripkeounter-model for 〈  − {Ci → Di}, Di ⇒ G 〉 is automatially the desiredounter-model for the sequent 〈  ⇒ G 〉. So we may assume that for eah i
164 V. Svejdarit is the sequent 〈  ⇒ Ci 〉 whih is not intuitionistially tautologial. Let
K1, . ., Km be ounter-models for 〈  ⇒ C1 〉 to 〈  ⇒ Cm 〉 respetively, andlet Km+1 and Km+2 be ounter-models for 〈  ⇒ E 〉 and 〈  ⇒ F 〉. We mayassume that the models K1, . ., Km+2 have roots a1, . ., am+2, all nodes ai satisfyall formulas in  , the node ai for i ≤ m violates Ci, and am+1 and am+2 violate
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1Figure 1: Amalgamation of Kripke modelsLet K be the model depited in Figure 1, with a new root a. To nish thedenition of the model K we have to speify the truth relation ‖−, i.e. to statethe truth values of atoms in a. Let all atoms p ∈   be evaluated positively in aand all remaining atoms negatively in a. Note that this hoie does not violatethe persisteny ondition, sine all atoms in   are positive in all nodes of allsubmodels Kj . Eah of the formulas Ci may be satised in various nodes of thesubmodels Kj , but the fat that Ci is violated in ai is suÆient for a onlusionthat a ‖−/ Ci. Similarly a ‖−/ E and a ‖−/ F . We have to hek that all formulasin   are satised in a. The set   ontains only atoms and impliations, and atomsare satised in a by denition. An impliation with a ompound premise mustbe one of Ci → Di. To verify a ‖− Ci → Di we have to hek that x ‖− Di foreah x aessible from a suh that x ‖− Ci. If x is a node of some Kj then thisis true beause all formulas in   are valid in Kj . If x is a then this is also truesine x ‖−/ Ci. Note that a similar argument applies also to impliations of theform ⊥ → D and p → D. If p → D ∈   then, by the denition of irreduiblesequent, p is not in   and as suh is evaluated negatively in a. So if 〈  ⇒ G 〉 is an intuitionistially tautologial sequent then the rules(7) and (8) may be not appliable (in reverse) to any formula we hoose; butif 〈  ⇒ G 〉 is irreduible then Theorem 3 guarantees that some of these rulesis appliable to some formula. Theorem 3 an be viewed as a generalization ofHarrop's theorem. A similar theorem appears also in [1℄ and is impliit in [5℄.Unfortunately Theorem 3 is still not suÆient for a deision proedure to bebased on: it is not sure that the sequent 〈  ⇒ Ci 〉 is shorter than 〈  ⇒ G 〉,and thus it is not guaranteed that using the left impliation rule (8) in reverseyields two simpler sequents. The solution is | when proessing an impliation
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loser look at the form of its premise. This is one of theimportant ideas in [4℄.Lemma 4. The following rules are sound and invertible:
〈 , A → (B → D) ⇒ G 〉 / 〈 , A &B → D ⇒ G 〉,(10)
〈 , A → D, B → D ⇒ G 〉 / 〈 , A ∨ B → D ⇒ G 〉,(11)
〈 , A, B → D ⇒ B 〉 / 〈 , (A → B) → D ⇒ A → B 〉.(12)Proof: is obvious. Now we are able to speify the deision proedure for sequents with one for-mula in suedent, and prove its properties. The heart of the proedure is aBoolean funtion S whih deides about a given sequent whether it is intuition-istially tautologial. The funtion S reursively alls itself in some ases. Thedeision proedure (main program) reads the input sequent 〈 ⇒ H 〉 and sim-ply alls the funtion S with a parameter 〈 ⇒ H 〉. The funtion S denotes itsparameter 〈  ⇒ G 〉 and works as follows:(a) If G is E & F then all S on 〈  ⇒ E 〉 and then on 〈  ⇒ F 〉. Return trueif both alls return true, return false otherwise.If G is E → F then use the rule (5), i.e. all S on 〈 , E ⇒ F 〉 and returnwhatever it returns.If   ontains a formula of the form E & F , E ∨ F , A& B → D, or A ∨ B → D,then proeed analogially, i.e. use the rule (3), (4), (10), or (11), respetively.(b) If   ontains a pair p, p → D then: replae p → D by D (i.e. use the rule (6)),remove all formulas of the form C1 → ( . . → (Ck → D). .) from   (i.e. use therule (9) repeatedly), all S on the resulting sequent and return whatever it returns.() If ⊥ ∈   or if G is an atom suh that G ∈   then return true.(d) If G is E ∨ F then all S on 〈  ⇒ E 〉 and on 〈  ⇒ F 〉. If some of thealls returns true then return true.(e) Create a list (A1 → B1) → D1, . ., (Am → Bm) → Dm of all impliationsin   with a ompound premise. Denote  i the set   − {(Ai → Bi) → Di}and denote  −i the set resulting from  i by removing all impliations of the form
C1 → ( . . → (Ck → Di). .). For i := 1 to m all S on 〈 i, Ai, Bi → Di ⇒ Bi 〉and on 〈 −i , Di ⇒ G 〉. If for some i both alls return true then return true.Otherwise return false.If the funtion S reahes the instrution (e) then the sequent 〈  ⇒ G 〉 is ir-reduible, and moreover, ompound premises of impliations in   must again beimpliations. If the number of suh impliations is zero then the funtion S re-turns false. Further explanation about the instrution (e) is in the nal part ofproof of Theorem 5.
166 V. SvejdarTheorem 5. The proedure speied above works in polynomial spae and or-retly deides whether a given sequent is intuitionistially tautologial.Proof: The omputation of a funtion like S, alling reursively itself in someases, an be viewed as a tree T with verties labeled by parameters of the alls.If S has to proess a sequent 〈  ⇒ G 〉, and when doing so it reursively allsitself with parameters 〈 1 ⇒ G1 〉 to 〈 m ⇒ Gm 〉, then the tree T ontains avertex labeled by 〈  ⇒ G 〉, with m immediate suessors labeled by 〈 1 ⇒ G1 〉to 〈 m ⇒ Gm 〉. The root of T is labeled by the input sequent 〈 ⇒ H 〉. Wehave to show that eah path in T terminates, i.e. ends with a vertex labeled by asequent proessed without reursive alls.We assoiate weights with onnetives and sequents. As in [4℄, the weight ofonjuntion & is 2 while the weight of ∨ and → is 1. The weight of an atom isalso 1. A weight of a sequent depends on the way how the sequent appeared in thedata of the funtion S. To dene it we think of some ourrenes of impliations ashighlighted . It will be lear from what is said below that a highlighted impliationnever ours in the sope of a onjuntion or a disjuntion or in the \left sope"of an impliation. It also never ours in a suedent of a sequent. Highlightedimpliations and the notion of suÆx dened below are meant to trae how aformula ourred in an anteedent of a sequent.Initially no impliation is highlighted. If the funtion S uses the rule (10),replaing some formula A & B → D ∈   by A → (B → D), then if the for-mula A → (B → D) is new , i.e. not an element of  , all impliations insideor (immediately) before the subformula D are preserved , i.e. highlighted or notaording to whether they were highlighted in the original formula A & B → D.The new impliation, whih is the main onnetive in A → (B → D), is not high-lighted. If S uses the rule (11) and replaes a formula A∨B → D by two formulas
A → D and B → D, then for eah of these two formulas, if the formula is new,all impliations inside the subformula D are preserved, and the main impliation,before the formula D, beomes highlighted. When S applies instrution (e) ithooses a formula (A → B) → D in   and replaes it by the pair A, B → D inone embedded all and by the formula D in the assoiated embedded all. In therst ase, if B → D is new then impliations inside and immediately before thesubformula D are preserved. In the seond ase, if D is new then impliationsinside it are preserved. In the remaining ases nothing happens with highlightedimpliations: in instrutions (b) and (e) some impliations, highlighted or not,merely disappear, and if S uses any of the rules (2){(5) or (7), in instrutions(a) or (d), then it proesses a formula ontaining no highlighted impliations.In any stage of the omputation, eah formula E ∈   an be written in theform C1 → ( . . → (Ck → D). .) where none of the formulas Ci and D ontainhighlighted impliations. The number k an be zero and D an still be an implia-tion. The part → (Ci → ( . . → (Ck → D). .)) of the formula E, together with aninformation whih impliations are highlighted in it, is a suÆx of E provided its
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v →. (w →. r),
13
s →. r ⇒ G 〉
〈Γ, t ∨ q → (w → r), u →. (w →. r), v →. (w →. r), s →. r ⇒ G 〉
〈Γ, t ∨ q → (w → r), (u ∨ v) → (w →. r), s →. r ⇒ G 〉
〈Γ, t ∨ q → (w → r), (u ∨ v) & w →. r, s →. r ⇒ G 〉
〈Γ, t ∨ q → (w → r), ((u ∨ v) & w) ∨ s → r ⇒ G 〉Figure 2: Weights and highlighted impliationsAn example of how the weights are determined is given in Figure 2. The vesequents an be viewed as both a fragment of a proof or loal data of the fun-tion S, where higher sequents orrespond to deeper reursive alls. Highlightedimpliations are marked with dots. In the formulas shown in the topmost sequentwe have a suÆx →. (w → r) whih ours twie, then a suÆx →. (w →. r) whihalso ours twie, and a suÆx →. r whih ours three times. Numbers abovesymbols show how the weight is omputed. If   ontains no highlighted implia-tions then the weight of the topmost sequent is 13 plus the number of symbolsin   ∪ {G} plus the number of onjuntions in   ∪ {G}.Let the input sequent 〈 ⇒ H 〉 have n symbols. Then its weight an bebounded by 2n. We would like to laim that whenever S alls itself while pro-essing a sequent 〈  ⇒ G 〉, the weight of the parameter(s) of the embedded allis lower than the weight of the urrent parameter 〈  ⇒ G 〉. In most ases itis true. For example, if S uses the rule (11), replaing a formula A ∨ B → Dby two formulas A → D and B → D, then the onnetives inside D and theimpliation next to D do not ount twie, and the prot is the removal of onedisjuntion. If S uses the rule (6), replaing a formula p → D by D, then itis quite possible that only the atom p in p → D ounts, while in the embed-ded all more symbols in D ount. This happens if the outermost impliationis highlighted, i.e. if the formula p → D has a suÆx → D, and there are moreformulas in   with the same suÆx. Note however that when the funtion S ap-plies instrution (b) it simultaneously removes all other formulas having the samesuÆx → D. So the minimal possible prot of replaing the formula p → D by Dand removing all formulas of the form C1 → ( . . → (Ck → D). .) is a dereasein weight by 1, the weight of the atom p. The same phenomenon ours in in-strution (e), when (A → B) → D is replaed by D. The only exeption whenthe weight may not derease is that all in instrution (e) where the funtion S
168 V. Svejdarreplaes a sequent 〈, (A → B) → D ⇒ G 〉 by 〈, A, B → D ⇒ B 〉: theformula B appears twie in the embedded all and it an be of higher weight thanthe removed formula G. However, this happens at most one for eah (ourreneof a) subformula B of the original sequent 〈 ⇒ H 〉. Thus we an laim thatwhenever the funtion S reursively alls itself, the weight of the parameter of theembedded all is lower, exept that at most n times the weight is inreased by atmost 2n. This means that eah path in the tree T of embedded alls has lengthat most quadrati in the length of the input sequent 〈 ⇒ H 〉, and our deisionproedure terminates on any input 〈 ⇒ H 〉. It is known ([3℄, [8℄, . . .) that thespae requirements of a funtion like S, alling reursively itself, is determinedby the sum of sizes of loal data of instanes of S along any path in the treeof reursive alls. When S is alled with parameter 〈  ⇒ G 〉 its loal data isessentially the sequent 〈  ⇒ G 〉 itself, and one an hek that its size is alsoquadrati in n. So our proedure works in polynomial spae.Let us say that a vertex in the tree T labeled by 〈  ⇒ G 〉 is positive ornegative aording to whether S returns true or false when proessing it. Letthe depth of a vertex v be the length of the longest path starting at v, wherethe length of a one-element path is zero. Consider the following laim. Let thedepth of a vertex v ∈ T labeled by 〈  ⇒ G 〉 be k. Then v is positive ifand only if 〈  ⇒ G 〉 is intuitionistially tautologial. This laim is provedby indution on k. Let, for example, v be a vertex of depth k labeled by a se-quent 〈  ⇒ G 〉 whih is intuitionistially tautologial and suh that none ofinstrutions (a){() in S is appliable. Assume that G is not a disjuntion. Then
G must be ⊥ or an atom p suh that p /∈  , and   ontains, besides the impli-ations (A1 → B1) → D1, . ., (Am → Bm) → Dm reated in instrution (e), onlysome atoms and some impliations p → D where p /∈  . Theorem 3 says that forsome i both sequents 〈 i, (Ai → Bi) → Di ⇒ Ai → Bi 〉 and 〈 i, Di ⇒ G 〉 areintuitionistially tautologial. It follows from invertibility of rules (12) and (9)that both sequents 〈 i, Ai, Bi → Di ⇒ Bi 〉 and 〈 −i , Di ⇒ G 〉, whih atas parameters of the embedded alls, are intuitionistially tautologial. The im-mediate suessors of v labeled by these two sequents have depth lower than k.So, by the indution hypothesis, S returns true when alled on them. Hene theresult of the omputation in instrution (e) is true, i.e. v is positive. We leave theremaining ases to the reader. A orollary of our onsiderations is that the single-onlusion alulus withinitial sequents (1) and rules (2){(7) and (9){(12), or (2){(9), is sound and om-plete with respet to Kripke semantis of intuitionisti logi. Note that as totermination of the deision proedure the paper [4℄ refers the reader to [3℄ whihgives a general and widely appliable method for proving termination but saysnothing about polynomial-spae. Note also that J. Hudelmaier [5℄ onstruts aalulus and a deision proedure muh more eÆient than ours: it works inspae O(n log n).
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 1694. A multi-onlusion deision proedureThe left impliation rule (8) from the previous setion is inherently non-inver-tible beause if it is used in reverse and the formula B replaes the formula G, theformula G disappears without a refund. The multi-onlusion alulus, allowingany number of formulas in suedent, is more onvenient in this respet beausethe usual multi-onlusion left impliation rule(∗) 〈  ⇒ , A 〉, 〈 , B ⇒  〉 / 〈 , A → B ⇒  〉,while still non-invertible, an be replaed by the following \non-extending" variant(20) 〈 , A → B ⇒ , A 〉, 〈 , A → B, B ⇒  〉 / 〈 , A → B ⇒  〉whih is invertible. Note that (20) an be simulated by (∗) by taking  ∪{A → B}for the set   in (∗). The rule (20) is a restrited variant of (∗): while the rule (∗)allows the prinipal formula A → B to simultaneously be a side formula, therule (20) requires it. To simplify (thinking about) the deision proedure speiedbelow, we formulate also the rules for onjuntion and disjuntion as non-extend-ing. So our multi-onlusion alulus has initial sequents(13) 〈 , p ⇒ , p 〉, 〈 ,⊥ ⇒  〉,and the following rules:
〈  ⇒ , A &B, A 〉, 〈  ⇒ , A &B, B 〉 / 〈  ⇒ , A &B 〉(14)
〈  ⇒ , A ∨ B, A, B 〉 / 〈  ⇒ , A ∨ B 〉(15)
〈 , A ⇒ B 〉 / 〈  ⇒ , A → B 〉(16)
〈  ⇒ , A → B, B 〉 / 〈  ⇒ , A → B 〉(17)
〈 , A &B, A, B ⇒  〉 / 〈 , A &B ⇒  〉(18)
〈 , A ∨ B, A ⇒  〉, 〈 , A ∨ B, B ⇒  〉 / 〈 , A ∨ B ⇒  〉(19)
〈 , A → B ⇒ , A 〉, 〈 , A → B, B ⇒  〉 / 〈 , A → B ⇒  〉.(20)Note that the alulus is very similar to aluli dened e.g. in [6℄ and [11℄. Themain dierene is the additional rule (17) whih an be alled weak impliationrule. It an easily be heked that all rules (14){(20) are sound with respetto Kripke semantis, and that all rules exept (16) are invertible. The rightimpliation rule (16) is now the only rule whih is inherently non-invertible. Notealso that the rule (16) is the only rule whih an bring new formulas: any formulanot introdued as a member of the set  in (16) must ome from initial sequents.The rule (16) is appliable only to a sequent with exatly one formula in suedent.Without this restrition, the rule would not be sound.
170 V. SvejdarLet us think about a deision proedure based on our multi-onlusion alulus.As in the previous setion, the proedure reads the input sequent 〈 ⇒ 
 〉 andalls a Boolean funtion, now named M , on it. The funtion M denotes itsparameter 〈  ⇒  〉, and in some ases reursively alls itself. It works asfollows:(a) If  ontains a formula A & B suh that A /∈  and B /∈  then all Mon 〈  ⇒ , A 〉 and on 〈  ⇒ , B 〉. Return true if both alls return true,return false if some returns false.Otherwise, use one of the rules (15) and (17){(20) aordingly, but only if pro-table, i.e. if the embedded all or both embedded alls has or have parameter(s)dierent from 〈  ⇒  〉.(b) If instrution (a) is not appliable then return true if ⊥ ∈   or if   and  havean atom in ommon.If instrution (a) is not appliable, i.e. if none of the rules (14), (15), (17){(20)an be protably used, then the sequent 〈  ⇒  〉 is saturated in the followingsense.Denition 6. A sequent 〈  ⇒  〉 is saturated if the following onditions aresatised:
◦ if A & B ∈   (or A ∨ B ∈ ) then both formulas A and B are in   (orin , respetively),
◦ if A ∨ B ∈   (or A & B ∈ ) then at least one of the formulas A and Bis in   (or in , respetively),
◦ if A → B ∈   then A ∈  or B ∈  ,
◦ if A → B ∈  then B ∈ .Theorem 7. A saturated sequent 〈  ⇒  〉 is intuitionistially tautologial ifand only if it is initial or if there is a formula A → B ∈  suh that A /∈   andthe sequent 〈 , A ⇒ B 〉 is intuitionistially tautologial.Proof: Again the nontrivial impliation is ⇒. So let 〈  ⇒  〉 be saturated,intuitionistially tautologial and not initial. Let A1 → B1, . ., Am → Bm be alist of all impliations A → B ∈  suh that A /∈  . Assume that none of thesequents 〈 , Ai ⇒ Bi 〉 is intuitionistially tautologial. Let K1, . ., Km be oun-ter-models for 〈 , Ai ⇒ Bi 〉. Assume that a1, . ., am are roots of K1, . ., Km.Let K be the model onstruted from K1, . ., Km as in the proof of Theorem 3,i.e. by stipulating that a1, . ., am are the only immediate suessors of a newroot a. Again, we evaluate all atoms in   positively and all the remaining atomsnegatively in a. Now the following laim an be proved by indution on omplexityof a formula D: if D ∈   then a ‖− D, and if D ∈  then a ‖−/ D. If D isan atom in   then a ‖− D by denition. If D is an atom in  then, sine thesequent 〈  ⇒  〉 is not initial, we have D /∈   and thus a ‖−/ D. So the laim istrue if D is an atom. It is evidently true also if D is ⊥. If D is A&B and D ∈ 
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 171then, by the denition of saturated sequent, A ∈  or B ∈ . The indutionhypothesis says a ‖−/ A or a ‖−/ B. So indeed a ‖−/ A & B. The remainingases when D is a onjuntion or a disjuntion in   or in  are similar. Solet D be A → B. First assume that D ∈  . We have to verify that x ‖− Bwhenever a ≤ x and x ‖− A. If x is an element of some submodel Ki of K thenthere is nothing to do sine ai ‖− D. If x = a then, beause 〈  ⇒  〉 is saturated,we have A ∈  or B ∈  , so x ‖−/ A or x ‖− B. Finally assume that D ∈ . If
D is some of the formulas A1 → B1, . ., Am → Bm, say Ai → Bi, then for x = aiwe have x ‖− A and x ‖−/ B. If D is dierent from all A1 → B1, . ., Am → Bmthen A ∈  . The fat that 〈  ⇒  〉 is saturated yields B ∈ . Note thatthis is the plae where the weak impliation rule (17) is helpful. By the indutionhypothesis, for x = a we have x ‖− A and x ‖−/ B. So in all ases when A → B ∈ there is an x aessible from a suh that x ‖− A and x ‖−/ B. So a ‖−/ A → B.
Having Theorem 7 we an omplete our deision proedure for multi-onlusionalulus:() If none of (a), (b) is appliable then reate a list A1 → B1, . ., Am → Bmof all impliations in  whose premise is not in  . Call M on 〈 , A1 ⇒ B1 〉to 〈 , Am ⇒ Bm 〉. Return true if some of the alls returns true, return falseotherwise.In the formulation of the following Theorem 8 we need the notion of positiveand negative ourrenes of formulas in a sequent 〈  ⇒  〉. All members of  are positive, all members of  are negative. If a formula A & B or A ∨ B ispositive (negative) then both subformulas A and B are positive (or negative,respetively). If a formula A → B is positive then the subformula A is negativeand the subformula B is positive. If a formula A → B is negative then thesubformula A is positive and the subformula B is negative. For example, in thesequent 〈 ¬¬p → p ⇒ p∨¬p 〉, the formula ¬p (i.e. p → ⊥) ours twie: positivelyas a part of the impliation ¬¬p, and negatively as a part of the disjuntion p∨¬p.Theorem 8. The proedure speied above works in polynomial spae and or-retly deides whether a given sequent 〈 ⇒ 
 〉 is intuitionistially tautologial.If the sequent 〈 ⇒ 
 〉 ontains n logial onnetives and r negative impliationsthen it either has a proof of depth O(n2) in the alulus with initial sequents (13)and rules (14){(20), or it has a Kripke ounter-model of depth at most r, in whihevery node has at most r immediate suessors.Proof: Let T be the tree of all alls of the funtion M , whih our when theproedure proesses a sequent 〈 ⇒ 
 〉 with n logial onnetives and r negativeimpliations E1 → F1, . ., Er → Fr, where obviously r ≤ n. Eah vertex v of T islabeled by a sequent 〈  ⇒  〉, the parameter of the all of M orresponding tothe vertex v. If M uses instrution 1 then v has one or two immediate suessors
172 V. Svejdaraording to whether M uses (in reverse) a unary or a binary rule. If M usesinstrution 2 then v has no suessors, i.e. is a leaf in T . In both ases M returnstrue if and only if all of the embedded alls return true. If M uses instrution 3then the sequent 〈  ⇒  〉 is saturated and non-initial and has m immediatesuessors where m is the number of impliations A → B in  suh that A /∈  .The number m an be zero in whih ase the vertex v is a leaf.A step made from a vertex v labeled by a saturated sequent to one of theimmediate suessors of v orresponds to the situation where M proesses animpliation A → B ∈  by alling itself on 〈 , A ⇒ B 〉. Note that in this asethe impliation A → B must be a member of the set {Ei → Fi; 1 ≤ i ≤ r} ofall negative impliations. Also note that the same impliation is never proessedagain on a path in T . From this it follow that eah path in T ontains at most r+1saturated sequents. The distane from one saturated sequent to another saturatedsequent on a path is bounded by 2n + 1, the number of all subformulas of asequent with n logial onnetives. This is beause eah use of an invertible ruleadds at least one new formula to  ∪. Thus eah path in T terminates and haslength O(n2). The size of loal data of any instane of M is quadrati in n. Sothe proedure works in polynomial spae.As in Theorem 5, let us say that a vertex in T labeled by 〈  ⇒  〉 is posi-tive or negative aording to whether M returns true or false when proessing it.Consider the following laim. Let a vertex v of T labeled by 〈  ⇒  〉 be suhthat the depth of the subtree of T generated by v is k and suh that on any pathfrom v to some leaf there are at most m+1 saturated sequents. Then if v is pos-itive it has a proof of depth at most k, and if v is negative it has a ounter-modelof depth at most m in whih every node has at most r immediate suessors.This laim is proved by an indution on k. Indeed, if k = 0 then either M appliesinstrution (b), in whih ase v is positive and the sequent 〈  ⇒  〉 is initial,i.e. having a proof of depth 0, or M applies instrution () with no embeddedalls, in whih ase v is negative and 〈  ⇒  〉 has a one-element, i.e. of depth 0,Kripke ounter-model. The indution step and the remaining onsiderations areleft to the reader. To know that intuitionisti propositional logi is deidable in polynomial spaeis interesting in onnetion with the fat that it is polynomial-spae hard. Thatis proved in [9℄; a relatively easy semantial proof an also be found in my [10℄.Let me remark that the preise role of the additional impliation rule (17) is notquite lear. It is redundant in the sense that it an be simulated by uts andthe alulus without this rule allows ut-elimination. However, I do not knowwhether the alulus with rules (14){(16) and (18){(20) diretly (polynomially)simulates the alulus with all rules (14){(20). Our treatment of multi-onlusionalulus, where the deision proedure never removes a formula from a sequent,an be viewed as showing that avoiding ontration is not the only way how toensure termination.
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